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Ein patriotischer Söldner? Sir Julius von Hartmann: ein Hannoveranischer Offizier  
im Britischen Dienst, 1803–1816
Die	Autoren	lenken	den	Blick	auf	überraschende	Kontinuitäten	von	Fremdenlegionen	in	einer	
Ära,	die	gemeinhin	mit	dem	Aufkommen	der	Nationalheere	und	der	wehrpflichtigen	Bürger-









The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars are commonly remembered as the birth hour 
of national armies. Mercenaries and professional soldiers, who had formed the backbone 
of Europe’s ancien régime armies, were suddenly swept away by numerically superior 
conscript levies. This new type of warrior, the conscript, seemed in almost every way the 
antithesis of the mercenary inasmuch as he was a civilian for whom soldiering did not 
represent an end on which his living depended but rather the means to defend the fa-
therland against foreign enemies. Moreover, while service in the old standing armies was 
associated with low socio-political status in the corporatist systems of the ancien régime, 
Comparativ | Zeitschrift für Globalgeschichte und vergleichende Gesellschaftsforschung 23 (2013) Heft 2, S. 13–26.
14 | Jasper Heinzen / Mark Wishon
conscription came to be regarded increasingly as an ingredient of active citizenship based 
on notions of equality among members of the national community.1 Although the Brit-
ish government never went so far as to implement the draft, Linda Colley has argued in 
her seminal study Britons (1992) that the protracted wars against France likewise forged 
an inclusive sense of Britishness that overarched ethnic, religious, class and political dif-
ferences.2
Recent scholarship, however, has rightly questioned whether the homogenising effect of 
the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars was as extensive and the introduction of con-
scription constituted as great a historical watershed as these accounts suggest.3 A telltale 
sign of continuity in military affairs was the persistence of foreign recruitment after 
1789. Even France, the home of the levée en masse, opted to raise new foreign regiments 
like the Légion franche étrangère or the Légion germanique for Austrian and Prussian de-
serters. If anything, Napoleon increased the army’s reliance on foreign volunteers with 
the creation of additional German, Italian, Polish, Copt and Greek auxiliary units.4 As 
Napoleon’s bid for hegemony in Europe gained momentum, it became more and more 
difficult for smaller states to maintain their independence and in consequence for sol-
diers to serve their home country. One of these victims of French expansionism was the 
Electorate of Hanover in 1803. In that year the First Consul, as Napoleon was then still 
styled, dispatched an expeditionary force to take possession of the British dependency, 
which was ruled in personal union by the king of England, George III, from London. 
Many veterans of the disbanded Hanoverian army subsequently left the Continent to 
practice their calling in Britain, where several foreign regiments such as the 60th Foot and 
Chasseurs Britanniques existed already. The British government welcomed the additional 
manpower for the war against France and therefore readily authorised the establishment 
of what became known as the King’s German Legion (KGL).5
	 The	historiography	is	extensive,	but	for	an	introduction	see	A.	Forrest,	The	Legacy	of	the	French	Revolutionary	
Wars:	The	Nation-in-Arms	in	French	Republican	Memory,	Cambridge	2009;	D.	Stoker/F.C.	Schneid/H.D.	Blanton	
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One of the earliest volunteers to join this foreign corps was the artillery officer (Georg) 
Julius Hartmann, who later rose to senior command in the Peninsula and Waterloo 
campaigns under the Duke of Wellington. Hartmann’s advancement in the British army 
suggests few of the pathological personality traits displayed by soldiers of fortune and 
adventurers elsewhere in this volume, yet closer inspection reveals that his curriculum 
vitae, too, is representative for the legal, socio-cultural and political state of ‘betwixt-
and-between’ that attracts certain go-getters during periods of historical transition. In 
Hartmann’s case liminality, the acute condition of living in between tradition and inno-
vation, manifested itself in a professional opportunism which perpetuated the mercenary 
ethos of earlier generations while at the same time showing a keen appreciation for the 
meritocratic and egalitarian ideals of the Revolution as a means of breaking through the 
ancien régime social barriers that disqualified bourgeois officers for the highest military 
offices.6 Furthermore, despite his cool weighing up of career options, Hartmann was 
also a Hanoverian patriot and became a self-proclaimed anglophile the longer he served 
under British colours. 
Many objective criteria have been proposed over the years to delimit mercenaries from 
regular combatants, but what such theoretical approaches often fail to take into account 
are the multifaceted aspirations of the individuals concerned and the ways in which 
the motives and self-image of professional soldiers who enter foreign employment can 
change over time.7 The age of the soldier of fortune may have been coming to an end at 
the beginning of the nineteenth century, but the transnational nature of the soldiering 
profession, a legacy of pre-modern European militaries, could still open doors for those 
who had as of yet not affixed themselves solely to their nation of origin. In tracing the 
negotiation of loyalty and ambition in the biography of Hartmann, the present article 
puts these neglected themes centre-stage while being mindful of the fact that the life 
of one individual can tell us only so much about larger historical phenomena. For this 
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mentor, the Hanoverian-born Prussian reformer Gerhard (von) Scharnhorst. Contrast-
ing and comparing their lives sheds interesting light not only on experiences of foreign 
enlistment in the Napoleonic period but also how their choices were gauged by later 
generations.
Julius Hartmann was born in 1774 into one of the patrician ‘pretty families’ who ranked 
second only to the aristocracy in the Electorate of Hanover. His father was a senior ad-
ministrator, as were many of his ancestors. However, being the third son and considered 
less intellectually gifted than his brothers, Hartmann’s parents destined the young boy 
to become an officer. The demotion to a lesser career path than his brothers incited 
already at this early age a determination in Hartmann to prove his father wrong for the 
lack of faith placed in him.8 After a brief stint as a volunteer-cadet he entered the Artil-
lery School in Hannover9, where Scharnhorst was a teacher and librarian. Scharnhorst’s 
affable intellectualism made quite an impression on Hartmann, according to whom the 
older man soon became his ‘patron’ and mentor.10 When war broke out with Revolution-
ary France in 1792, the pair joined the Anglo-Hanoverian expeditionary corps sent into 
Flanders to halt the French advance. Their conjoined fates did not end there because it 
was Hartmann who commanded the artillery in the besieged fortress of Menin (1794) 
while Scharnhorst rallied his forces to lead the Allied sortie to victory, an action that 
would earn him promotion to major. 
Scharnhorst saw enough potential in his former pupil to offer him a staff position follow-
ing his appointment as quartermaster-general of Hanoverian forces in northwest Ger-
many. Both officers aspired to get ahead in a profession dominated by the aristocracy 
and a shared interest in the military sciences. Their professional association lasted for two 
years (1797-99), during which time Scharnhorst already began gravitating towards Prus-
sia. The reason for his desire to leave the country of his birth had to do with the denial of 
opportunities for implementing his proposals for army reform, yet personal ambition of 
a more old-fashioned kind – the lure of better pay, promotion and ennoblement – also 
played a decisive role.11 With one-fourth to three-fifths of senior ranks across all branches 
being filled by non-Prussians as late as 1805, the Hohenzollern army provided a conge-
nial environment to realise Scharnhorst’s dreams of promotion, although the royal court 
proved less open to his programme for reform at the time. As Peter Paret has astutely 
observed, ‘nothing is more far-fetched than to interpret this tide of ambition and talent 
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recognized – that the future lay with Prussia.’ For Scharnhorst and professional officers 
like him, switching employers was above all a business decision.12
Hartmann was no exception. When French troops occupied Hanover in 1803, he first 
wrote to his former mentor for a Prussian commission, but on receiving an unexpected 
offer from London for a captaincy in the KGL artillery, he accepted it. Even more so 
than the Prussian army, the Legion embodied the spirit of the ‘betwixt-and-between’ that 
characterised European military culture in the age of the French Revolution and Napo-
leon. The voluntary expatriation of thousands of Hanoverian veterans, which France ini-
tially permitted, and their reassembly on British soil under the colours of their sovereign 
may have been a moving patriotic spectacle, yet the Legion had an undeniable mercenary 
purpose underneath the propaganda.13 As the name implied, the King’s German Legion 
was never just a Hanoverian corps. While certain contingents, particularly among the of-
ficer corps of the artillery and cavalry formations, became notable for their professional-
ism and close association with the Electorate, the more cosmopolitan infantry regiments 
were viewed with the same suspicion that dogged most foreign corps.14 After several years 
campaigning in the Iberian Peninsula, the KGL even lost its broader German composi-
tion, since attrition in the field caused other nationalities to gain entry as well. However, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Friedrich von der Decken, the co-creator of the Legion and a per-
sonal friend of Scharnhorst, was the first to admit the naturalness of these cosmopolitan 
dynamics in war. He propounded the view that Europeans shared common cultural 
roots to a degree not seen in any other part of the world. A German soldier who served in 
Austria, next in Prussia, and finally in some other army changed only the uniform while 
‘his lifestyle and way of being remain the same.’15 Decken concluded that armies did not 
need patriotic citizen-soldiers to be effective as long as they could draw on a sufficient 
supply of technicians who combined drill with combat experience.16 
Thus, rather than imitating French novelties, Decken and his sponsors at the English 
court patterned the KGL on foreign regiments found in some ancien régime armies. Like 
‘military enterprisers’ of the early modern period Decken received a royal warrant to raise 
German troops, in return for which he was promised the most senior rank in the Legion 
and a commission for every signed-up recruit.17 For Hanoverian enlistees, the presence 












zogs	 Adolph	 Friedrich	 von	 Cambridge	 zum	 Generalgouverneur	 von	 Hannover	 (8–86)’,	 in:	 Niedersäch-
sisches	Jahrbuch	für	Landesgeschichte,	65	(99),	p.	22.	The	term	‘military	enterpriser’	has	been	borrowed	from	
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proved a great stimulus for initial recruiting efforts. Officers had their own incentives to 
join. As one KGL officer recalled, his desire stemmed ‘aside from patriotic reasons, the 
extraordinary benefits of British service.’18 A comparably good salary was promised to 
officers along with the prospect of promotion by merit instead of purchase like the rest 
of the British army. They enjoyed all the privileges of British officers but remained sub-
ject to their own code of military discipline by virtue of their legal status as Hanoverian 
subjects. Cashiering inept commission-holders remained the prerogative of the Legion’s 
colonel-in-chief, an appointee of Elector-King George III resident in the United King-
dom. Even in the field British commanders did not dare to infringe on the colonel’s 
authority.19 Hartmann was quick to appreciate the opportunities for independent action 
these terms of service held out. On receiving his captaincy, he assumed the function of a 
military enterpriser by initially staying behind in Hannover to enlist artillerymen.20 That 
Hartmann’s entry into the KGL was at least in the early stages of his appointment a stra-
tegic professional choice in keeping with pre-Revolutionary traditions of transferrable 
loyalties can be gleaned from the fact that he contemplated an exchange into the regular 
British army to secure further promotion shortly after arriving in the British Isles.21
Mercenaries, it is often emphasised, differ from national soldiers in that they fight for 
financial gain without an ideological attachment to the country that pays them. By the 
same token a regular fighter must then be an individual for whom loyalty to the father-
land and allegiance to one army come first.22 As will have become clear by now, Hart-
mann and his Hanoverian associates did not fit these neat, ideal-typical distinctions. 
Even though pragmatic considerations impacted on the choice of employer, there existed 
unanimity about their disdain for a French commission. Hartmann’s relatives in French-
occupied Germany never failed to comment on the ‘fearfulness and lack of character’ 
exhibited by compatriots who decided to collaborate with the Napoleonic regime.23 
Scharnhorst, too, left no doubt in one telling letter to his friend Decken that he found 
the thought of serving in an army controlled entirely by France impossible to bear.24
Hartmann and Scharnhorst were mercenaries in the sense that cultural-political affinities 













Hanovrienne:	 Eine	 unbekannte	 Hilfstruppe	 Napoleons	 80–8’,	 in:	 G.	 Schnath,	 Ausgewählte	 Beiträge	 zur	
Landesgeschichte	Niedersachsens,	Hildesheim	968,	pp.	280-29.	
24	 Scharnhorst	 to	 Decken,	 4	 July	 807,	 reprinted	 in	 J.	 Niemeyer	 (ed.),	 Scharnhorst-Briefe	 an	 Friedrich	 von	 der	
Decken	80–8,	Bonn	987,	p.	8.			
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of these two powers was not incommensurate with their patriotic sensibilities. On the 
contrary, since it became increasingly apparent that Napoleon would only be defeated if 
all his enemies acted in concert, astute officers with technological expertise and general 
staff experience began to see their career possibilities in a grander Continental context 
that remained true to this mission. The presence alongside Hartmann’s KGL of Ger-
man nationals such as those of the Brunswick-Oels corps, or the self-exiled remnants of 
Ferdinand von Schill’s Freikorps, was owed predominantly to this same expanded view, 
that resistance to French hegemony might best be found outside of central Europe in the 
army of Napoleonic France’s perennial opponent, Britain.25
Service abroad opened up avenues for the transfer of knowledge as well as manpower to 
other allies where it was needed.26 Had Scharnhorst not found a way to evade French 
demands for his dismissal in Prussia, he would have taken up the inspectorate general of 
the Royal Military College at High Wycombe, which trained Britain’s staff officers, the 
so-called ‘scientifics’, for Wellington’s war in the Peninsula.27 Several of his most trusted 
aides, including Carl von Clausewitz, Karl von Grolman and Karl von Tiedemann did 
exchange into the Russian and Austrian service, however. ‘Secondment’ to a foreign 
power benefited not only the host but was also seen as an opportunity to broaden the 
mental horizons of the officers concerned by familiarising them with other countries 
and peoples. One would have to look no further than Hartmann’s own billets during 
the Peninsular War for evidence of transnational cultural exchange. His close friend and 
fellow artillery officer, Simon Frazer, wrote home from one of the abodes they stayed at: 
‘You would be dinned with the noise of the room in which I write; German, Portuguese, 
Spanish and English, all talking at once.’28 Such interactions exemplified what Ute Fre-
vert has identified as a key feature of organised violence, namely webs of communica-
tion across national boundaries and patterns of involvement that defied the xenophobic 
excesses of such events as the Napoleonic Wars.29
For Hartmann transnational dialogue was both a virtue and a necessity. It engendered a 
personal appreciation for the liberal social customs of English society and convinced him 
that timely adaptation to the rules of the host country was the better part of valour. Be-
ing fluent in English, Hartmann took it upon himself to translate military manuals into 
German in order to help his Hanoverian comrades adjust better to life in Britain.30 This 
scrupulous adherence to the conventions of British military culture hinted at an ulterior 
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Time and again the latter related in glowing terms how much resolve the legionaries 
displayed in proving to their families at home and, more importantly, the British public 
that they were disciplined soldiers with ideals and not a mercenary rabble. Their failed at-
tempt to induce a general uprising in Hanover against Napoleon during Lord Cathcart’s 
abortive invasion of the north German littoral in 1805/6 stung them profoundly because 
it created the impression in London that the Legion lacked the capacity and patriotic 
credentials to mobilise their compatriots, whether this was true or not.31 
Hartmann’s method of counteracting the damage was by exerting himself in the field 
while attached to Wellington’s forces in Portugal and Spain. He was first given command 
of three KGL artillery batteries but soon found himself in charge of larger mixed Anglo-
Hanoverian contingents, leading eventually to his appointment as commander of the 
entire British artillery at the battle of Albuera (1811) and siege of Bayonne (1814). Other 
honours accompanied these elevations. After the battle of Salamanca (1812) Welling-
ton recommended him for promotion to lieutenant-colonel and, after Vittoria (1813), 
a special lifelong pension from the British government in recognition of his technical 
accomplishment. To top it all off, he was admitted to a select group of foreigners (and 
an even smaller party of officers below the rank of major-general) to receive the Knight-
Commander-class of the Order of the Bath in 1815.32 
These achievements made Hartmann immensely proud because they bore witness to 
his and the Legion’s acceptance by their British comrades. Fear of social ostracism long 
haunted Hanoverian officers due to the half-mercenary origins of the Legion and a 
widespread belief that the British upper classes thought themselves innately superior to 
Continentals. Decken elaborated on these concerns in a treatise on the English national 
character first published in 1802 and reissued in a revised edition fifteen years later. 
Therein he expounded on the courage and patriotism of Britons but also their general in-
tolerance of foreigners, which allegedly forced immigrants from the Continent to adopt 
British customs quickly lest they face isolation.33 Decken experienced this first-hand in 
1803 when he attracted the hostility of British officers after his promotion to colonel, a 
reaction attributable to resentment about the speed with which this foreigner climbed 
the ranks of the British army.34 Since Hartmann had his own encounter with aristo-
cratic snobbism in the person of his one-time commanding officer in Spain, Sir Thomas 
Graham, he was all the more impressed when the majority of senior officers he served 
under did not conform to the negative stereotype. Sir Rowland Hill, Lord Beresford and 
the Duke of Wellington readily recognised foreign merit in general and Hartmann’s in 
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British army in a way that transcended narrow allegiance to the KGL or Hanover. Dur-
ing the period of Hanover’s occupation, the Legion, and more broadly the institution of 
the British army, became the epicentre from which they drew their self-identity, not their 
far-off fatherland or the nation for which they now served. On the European periphery 
of the Iberian Peninsula Hartmann felt that he belonged to an Anglo-Hanoverian broth-
erhood-in arms in which mutual respect and dependence on each other suspended the 
national distinctions of the metropolitan world. The award of permanent British rank 
to the Legion officers for their distinguished military performance in 1812 accelerated 
this development by blurring the legal exceptionalism of Hanoverians in Wellington’s 
army.36 As a result the end of the Napoleonic Wars evoked mixed feelings because the 
disestablishment of the KGL threatened to pull the brotherhood apart. The heroic wel-
come given to the legionaries by the liberated fatherland offered limited consolation 
because officers of the Landwehr (militia) regiments established in 1813 considered them 
unwanted rivals for scarce positions in the reconstituted Hanoverian army.37 
Though the Landwehr officers took to calling their colleagues ‘the English’ to undermine 
their patriotic prestige in Hanover, Hartmann quickly landed on his feet. In 1815 he was 
appointed colonel and three years later major-general of artillery. A residual unhappiness 
remained: ‘In English services I knew who I was and where I fit in, now in the Hanove-
rian army I first have to get use to the whims of those who govern.’38 On campaign he 
had developed valuable skills in leadership, tactics and the practical application of mili-
tary technology, which necessarily atrophied in peacetime and became ‘dead capital’.39 
The ensuing restlessness caused friction with fellow ex-legionaries in the army, who, like 
him, were deprived of a professional outlet for their pent-up energies. Hartmann found 
some relief in private life, at least, by preserving his preference for things English. As he 
settled into married life and started a family, he decorated his house with portraits of 
British generals, ate food in the English fashion, spoke English with his children and cor-
responded regularly with friends in the United Kingdom. His insistence on being called 
‘Sir Julius’ reflected perhaps most tellingly the extent to which he had come to think of 
himself as an English gentleman since joining the KGL in 1803.40
Prolonged exposure to a foreign culture in combination with progressive estrangement 
from the home environment remoulded the identities of other officers in different ways, 
too. Lieutenant-General Charles Count von Alten, the KGL’s highest-ranking field com-
mander, mutated into a perfect ‘Anglo-Hanoverian gentleman’, like his subordinate.41 
Scharnhorst’s budding relationship to the state of Prussia added a twist to this theme of 
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a socio-cultural challenge because the existence of the Anglo-Hanoverian personal union 
made a transfer of monarchical allegiance unnecessary, Scharnhorst found himself at the 
mercy of a new sovereign as well as an alien social environment. That King Friedrich 
Wilhelm III put his confidence in him cemented a personal obligation to the Hohen-
zollern monarchy but fostered only in the second instance identification with Prussia. 
As he explained to an old personal friend in 1810, ‘From the beginning till the present 
I have been showered with indescribable kindness by my king; gratitude kept me in his 
service, otherwise I would have gone to the England after the peace of Tilsit, where a very 
advantageous job offer awaited me.’42 Beside the support of the king, it was the impact 
of his reforms on Prussian society and their expected payoff for Germany’s liberation 
from Napoleonic domination, which swayed Scharnhorst to stay. A commitment to the 
Prussian state only gained the upper hand on the eve of the Befreiungskriege when he 
assured General Ludwig von Yorck that he was now ready to share the uncertain fate of 
his ‘fatherland’.43 
Hanoverian officers on the whole adjusted well to soldiering abroad, then, but how did 
contemporaries and posterity judge their deviation from the new-fangled ideal of the 
patriotic citizen? In the case of the Legion, the long absence of veterans from Germany 
and their exotic war experiences in distant parts of Europe did not lend themselves easily 
to constructions of male valorousness centred around the embeddedness of soldiers in 
stable family structures and the national Volksfamilie, whose protection formed the raison 
d’être of the patriot-in-arms, according to Prussian propagandists of the time.44 The posi-
tive qualities ascribed to the legionaries necessarily had to focus on different strengths. 
Instead of being hailed as family men, Hanoverian volunteers gained patriotic legitimacy 
from the sacrifice of domestic bliss in pursuing the liberation of their fatherland and the 
restoration of their ancestral ruling house from overseas. Masculine virtues attributed 
to this conduct included self-reliance, honour, fidelity, courage and a commitment to 
justice.45 The mercenary features of legionary recruitment were conveniently margin-
alised in media of collective memory such as Hannover’s Waterloo Column (1832) or 
anniversary commemorations since in the end the triumphant returning home of the 
veterans with foreign medals and other tokens of British admiration counted more than 
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In Anglo-Hanoverian relations the Legion represented a bilateral asset of considerable 
value, given the persistence of the personal union until 1837 and the still close dynastic 
connections thereafter. Even though the corps formally disbanded in 1816, prominent 
officers like Hartmann were instrumental in keeping alive the old friendship between 
the two countries. They defended the British army wherever possible against criticism 
from outsiders. In the Hannoversches Militairisches Journal Hartmann published his rec-
ollections of the war in Portugal and Spain for the express purpose of combating the 
‘incurable bias’ with which French military writers evaluated their former opponents.47 
Moreover, in the year of his promotion to commanding general of the Hanoverian artil-
lery (1836) he spoke up publicly for Wellington when the duke disparaged Prussian dis-
cipline at Waterloo in a statement before Parliament.48 This partiality to the British side 
stemmed from Hartmann’s emphatic belief that the victories of the heterogeneous Allied 
fighting force in the Peninsula, which comprised Britons, Germans, Portuguese, Span-
iards and French émigrés, were due to the Iron Duke’s superior generalship. According 
to this reading of the historical record Wellington epitomised the esprit de corps of the 
army, making him a projection space for the memories of travails and dangers endured 
by British and Hanoverian veterans together.49 
Hartmann’s readiness to help maintain and participate in the transnational space of 
memory won him respect on both sides of the Channel. The great British military his-
torian Sir William Napier, author of the History of the War in the Peninsula (1828-40), 
promptly agreed to modify his interpretation of historical evidence in the third volume 
after reading Hartmann’s articles about the Peninsular Campaign.50 It was in tribute to 
the ageing general’s excellent standing in Britain that King Georg V of Hanover selected 
him for the diplomatic mission to convey the news of his father’s passing to Queen 
Victoria in 1851. Hartmann died five years later at the age of eighty-two, having been 
ennobled just one day before his passing. Admirers in the United Kingdom recognised 
his achievements by noting that he was ‘one of the last – if not the very last – of those 
able Hanoverian commanders, who held high positions in the English army during the 
Peninsular War[,] who shared with British soldiers the toils and the glories of that event-
ful time’.51
In Germany, the president of the prestigious Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Georg 
Waitz, set somewhat different accents in his entry on Hartmann in the Allgemeine Deutsche 
Biographie. Waitz concurred that Hartmann typified a ‘curiously happy’ combination of 
German and British socialising influences, but a large portion of the short article dealt 
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then until his retirement, Waitz explained, Hartmann had used his practical knowledge 
to modernise drill manuals, test new technologies and extend the scientific training of 
NCOs and officers in the artillery.52 Listing these details implicitly Germanised Hart-
mann to demonstrate his conformity with the ideals of military professionalism first 
laid down by his erstwhile teacher, Scharnhorst. When Waitz’s article appeared in the 
late 1870s, overshadowed by Germany’s recent victories in the Franco-Prussian War, 
there was no question of which state ‘owned’ the legacy of Scharnhorsts’s great military 
reforms, namely Prussia and by extension Germany.53 This had not always been the case. 
After the reformer’s death from a wound received at the battle of Großgörschen in 1813, 
his cherished patron, King Friedrich Wilhelm III, still balked at the idea of honouring 
the free-thinking ‘foreigner’ with a public monument.54 
The ensuing apotheosis of Scharnhorst and Waitz’s attempt to de-anglicise Hartmann 
in German memory mirrored differences of opinion in Britain and Germany about the 
purpose of land armies. Whereas the states of the German Confederation accepted more 
or less since the Wars of Liberation that success in battle depended on well-trained stand-
ing armies officered by experts skilled in the science of war and patriotic citizen-soldiers 
on whom governments could rely on for backup, the United Kingdom settled on a small 
fighting force of under 100,000 volunteers led by men who until the 1860s bought their 
commissions. Britain could afford to do so because of her strong navy. Manpower short-
ages arose, however, when the British government was pulled into supplying troops for 
Continental conflicts, as happened during the Crimean War (1854-56). It was in mo-
ments like these that the successful precedent of the KGL resurfaced in favour of foreign 
recruitment. ‘Whenever […] we are called upon for extra exertions in the way of war’, 
The Economist counselled, ‘we should use our own heads and purses, but the lives and 
sinews of others.’55 Ideas for the resurrection of a KGL-style foreign corps progressed so 
far that settlers in New South Wales began advocating a possible deployment to the colo-
nies in order to relieve British soldiers there.56 Although the regiments raised under the 
provisions of the 1854 Foreign Enlistment Act never quite lived up to the expectations 
set in them, and thus deterred the British government from pursuing the creation of a 
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tional cooperation whose shining example inspired debates about foreign recruitment in 
Britain into the 1950s.57
Wars change societal norms just as societies change the nature of war. Its has become 
commonplace to argue that the French and Revolutionary Wars ushered in a new kind 
of warfare built on ideological principles; mercenary armies gave way to the myth of the 
citizen-soldier because concepts like liberty and nation enabled large segments of the 
population to see in the state ‘the embodiment of some absolute Good for which no 
price was too high’.58 And yet the life of the Anglo-Hanoverian artillery officer Julius 
Hartmann throws into relief rather more complicated reasons that guided the career 
choices of professional soldiers in this age of supposedly ‘total war’.59 He and his men-
tor Scharnhorst remained wedded to the cosmopolitan precepts of the ancien régime 
whereby officers took service in foreign states to receive promotion or simply to broaden 
their knowledge of other cultures. Patriotism factored into the choice of employer in an 
only indirect manner. Hartmann’s conscience remained unencumbered for holding a 
British commission because the United Kingdom and Hanover were connected through 
a dynastic union. To him loyalty was not something one owed primarily to a territory or 
a people, but rather the monarch in whom sovereignty resided. His political ideas were 
thus firmly rooted in the constitutional theory of the eighteenth century. Yet service with 
the King’s German Legion over time softened the legal and cultural differences that Ha-
noverians and Britons had to navigate as part of the dynastic union between their coun-
tries. The campaigns in the Iberian Peninsula left Hartmann a true frontier runner ‘on 
the margins of sovereignty and legitimacy’, where allegiance and power were determined 
more by personal relationships than abstract principles. 
Although Scharnhorst showed fewer political scruples than Hartmann in abandoning 
his sovereign for the greener pastures of another king, the differences between mentor 
and pupil should not be exaggerated. Both valued personal loyalty to the employers of 
their choice. There was also a striking parallelism in the fact that they sent their sons into 
foreign armies, the KGL and the Prussian cavalry respectively, instead of keeping them 
closer to home. Their own experiences had taught Scharnhorst and Hartmann that the 
more they devoted themselves to the transnational European military profession, the 
easier it was for them to make decisions that did not always include immediate mon-
etary gain, or the self-satisfaction (or posthumous commendation) of the citizen soldier 
fighting exclusively for hearth and family. They knew that under the right circumstances 
professional self-fulfilment abroad could even evolve into emotional affinities with the 
adoptive fatherland. Integration in turn depended on reciprocity by way of rewards for 
merit. According to Hartmann’s son the pursuit of martial and social distinction in the 
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the most decorated and most respected officers, he embodied to an extraordinary degree 
the spirit which let [the Legion] steadfastly and unchangeably prevail under the most 
trying circumstances during twelve hard years.’60 It was this spirit of wanderlust, ambi-
tion and professionalism which persuaded governments to establish foreign legions in 
the nineteenth century, despite or perhaps because of everything that the myth of the 
citizen-soldier entailed. 
60	 J.	v.	Hartmann,	Lebenserinnerungen	(40),	p.	2.
